The Fraud Bill, which received Royal Assent on 8 November 2006, created an offence of fraud in English criminal law which marks a departure of utmost significance from the approach adopted hitherto, whereby a number of related offences cover behaviour deemed to amount to fraud.
Notwithstanding the regulatory challenges arising, the Law Commission was insistent that the consequences of failing to address the problem of fraud in this context would be severe. It illustrated this by reference to the Institute of Chartered Accountants' assessment that 'business fraud is a growing problem that affects everyone . . . [t] he cost to the country is huge in terms of those who have to pay for it and the loss of reputation as a safe place to do business'. 6 The Law Commission was instructed to consider whether existing law relating to fraud was comprehensible to juries; adequate for effective prosecution; and fair to potential defendants, but also explicitly whether it met 'the need of developing transfers', to determine whether it was sufficiently flexible to be applicable to new scenarios. 7 The accompanying instruction to make recommendations with all 'due expedition' included the direct request that it consider the merits of introducing a general offence of fraud into English criminal law. This commenced the extensive inquiry into the criminal law relating to fraud which culminated in the Fraud Bill which was first introduced in Parliament in May 2005, following recommendations made in the Law Commission's Report on Fraud published in 2002, 8 and government consultation in 2004. 9 Following further parliamentary consideration during 2006, the Bill which stated in its preamble that it was to 'make provision for, and in connection with criminal liability for fraud and obtaining services dishonestly', 10 received Royal Assent on 8 November 2006.
For criminal lawyers, the Fraud Act's main import lies in the way in which it will fundamentally alter the approach to financial crime traditionally adopted in criminal law. Solicitor-General Mike O'Brien told the House of Commons in June 2006 that the Bill is a measure which has been eagerly awaited by prosecutors and by the police, and this was because it 'should improve the prosecution process by reducing the chance of offences being wrongly charged, and provide greater flexibility to keep pace with the increasing use of technology in crimes of fraud'. In contrast Mr O'Brien also made reference to the way in which 'strange as it may seem . . . [w] hen lawyers talk of fraud, we refer collectively to a wide and complex array of deception and theft offences . . . and common law, [which] compiled somewhat haphazardly, have the task of encompassing the wide range of fraudulent conduct'.
Commission in its insistence in 2002 that the law was in need of reform, and that a 'Fresh Approach' was required. 12 In the course of emphasising the need to thwart the 'inexhaustible ingenuity' of fraudsters, 13 in 2002 the Law Commission proposed that pursuing reform through specific offences was likely to continue the position whereby the law would be 'always lagging behind developments in technology and commerce'.
14 Following government consultation and parliamentary debate, the Fraud Act's 'centrepiece' offence mirrors closely the Law Commission's recommendations for a statutory general fraud offence. 15 The offence seeks to capture base elements of fraud, but to do so in a manner which is deliberately not attached to any specific activity which might arise from the 'modern methods by which dishonest activity may be effected'. 16 And accordingly, what are now ss 1-5 of the Fraud Act provide that a person is guilty of fraud if he dishonestly makes a false representation; 17 fails to disclose information while under a legal duty to do so; 18 or abuses a position in which he is expected to safeguard or at least not to prejudice the financial interests of another, 19 and in the commission of any of these matters intends to make a gain or expose another to loss.
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The scope of the Fraud Act and its intended function and purpose
Although this article is most interested in the fraud offence, the scope of the Fraud Act is wider, and includes the offence of obtaining services dishonestly which is also intended to apply widely across commercial and everyday life activities. 21 There is also liability for being in possession of articles for use in frauds, and making or supplying articles for use in frauds. 22 The new offence of 'Participating in a fraudulent business carried on by a sole trader' intends to extend liability which can already 12 This is the heading adopted in Part VI of the Law Commission's Report on Fraud, at 57. 
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be incurred in respect of a company, where a business is carried on with intent to defraud creditors of the company or creditors of any other person, or for any fraudulent purpose. 23 Penalties across the new Act reflect current political concerns for the need to address the way in which, according to former Lord Chancellor Lord Irvine, '. . . the public has at times felt that those responsible for major crimes in the commercial sphere have managed to avoid justice'. 24 This sentiment in turn echoed the views of Lord Roskill from over a decade earlier that the way in which serious fraud appeared to escape detection or successful prosecution had served only to 'encourage its growth, with potentially harmful consequences'. 25 The Fraud Bill matches the substantive law with the consequences of allowing the perpetration of fraud to flourish by providing that the fraud offence will carry a maximum penalty of 10 years' imprisonment for those convicted on indictment.
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This is clearly a strong message against tolerance of fraud, but equally, during its consideration before Parliament, ministers were very keen to clarify that the Fraud Bill was part of a much more extensive and more ambitious package of measures to combat fraud. According to the Solicitor-General, the aim of the Fraud Bill was to 'get the law right' 27 but that, alongside this, the government is equally concerned with improving the investigation of fraud by the police and other agencies, 28 and ensuring that the criminal courts are able to deal effectively and expeditiously with trial proceedings. 29 While accepting that the fraud offence-and even the Act within which it is now located-is not intended to be a 'standalone' initiative, this article is concerned with whether the new fraud offence will be able to 'get the law right'. It will open up some thoughts on whether the fraud offence can be expected to deliver an effective, widely applicable, and yet flexible mechanism for determining criminal liability for fraud. In this spirit, it is particularly interested in the issues which might arise from the manner in which it will be established that a defendant-in making a false representation; in failing to disclose information; or by abusing a position of trust-has committed fraud. 
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Shortly after the Fraud Bill's initial presentation in Parliament in 2005 it was suggested that, for a number of reasons, fact-finders may experience difficulties in finding that a defendant charged with fraud has acted dishonestly. 32 This proposition was based upon the discussion of issues pertaining to criminalising business activity, and also those arising in respect of 'everyday-life crime'. This present discussion seeks to build on these foundational ideas by pointing to the significance for this debate on law reform of the academic study of white-collar crime, which has grown from the work of Edwin Sutherland. During the 1940s, Sutherland coined the term 'white-collar crime' while studying criminal behaviour amongst professional classes, which could not be explained by established theories which linked crime with poverty and its associated pathologies. 33 Sutherland's most famous and controversial legacy is his definition of 'white collar crime' as 'crime committed by a person of respectability and high social status in the course of his occupation'. 34 Today, scholars continue to be fascinated by white-collar crime, and it has been suggested elsewhere that this richly textured and multidisciplinary literature could have made a valuable contribution to the otherwise lengthy consideration of fraud and the criminal law set in motion in 1998. 35 
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destructive capabilities of white-collar crimes; their 'ambivalent' nature, and also the related ambiguities surrounding their 'respectable' perpetrators. More specifically, there appears to be within this literature base substantial support for the authors' concerns that the fraud offence may not necessarily be able to increase effectiveness in criminal responses as intended, and as believed by many.
The Fraud Bill's original reception in Parliament was as a 'model piece of law reform', 39 and the optimism for the fraud offence within it continued throughout the Bill's journey through both Houses during 2006. Indeed, the tenor of the Solicitor-General's address noted above was very much that the Act will get the law right. At one level there clearly are grounds for confidence, because fraud will actually be a criminal offence in its own right, and, as recommended by the Law Commission, will not be attached to identifying 'specific types of dishonest behaviour as deserving of criminality'. 40 Moreover, notwithstanding the offence's general nature, it does provide fact-finders with a conduct-based framework for applying Ghosh. 41 Further encouragement can also be drawn from the way in which that, as the technical detail of the offence (and indeed the other offences within the Bill) were worked through, parliamentary debate during 2006 did emphasise the offence's significance and its potential radically to alter approaches to fraud. Although this was the case during its initial reception in 2005, it was suggested at the time that debate was too focused on the technical aspects of the offence, and insufficient attention was being paid to 'wider perspectives' on the seriousness of fraud. 42 Not only was parliamentary discussion of the seriousness of fraud during June 2006 the fullest which had occurred at any stage of the Fraud Bill's genesis, but its 'wider' implications were at that stage also insightfully being attached to the way in which the government is seeking to formulate a coherent strategy to 'reduce the incidence of fraud and the harm to which it can lead'. 43 Furthermore, there did appear at this latter stage to be appreciation in both Houses of popular perceptions which regard fraud as a 'victimless' crime. However, what has not attracted any attention is what might actually inform conceptions of financial crimes as ones which are 'victimless', beyond frequent but also fleeting reference to their secretive nature and apparent lack of victim, and in some cases-for example, in an insurance fraud-comparatively easy pecuniary gain. While there is some appreciation of why it is important to break down conceptions that fraud may be 'victimless', this is occurring largely without any reference to how such perceptions have come into being. At one level it might not 39 See Wilson, above n. 32. 40 Report on Fraud, para. 7.2. 41 Contrast the Law Commission's assessment (Report on Fraud, para. 1.6) of the then current position in which none of the numerous charges that are brought in relation to fraud 'adequately describe or encapsulate the meaning of "fraud" in circumstances where it falls to a jury to determine whether the defendant has been dishonest'. 42 Wilson, above n. 32. 43 Hansard, col. 545, 12 June 2006.
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be difficult to see how insurance fraud or that associated with obtaining credit facilities 44 might appear 'victimless', but appreciation of how and why conceptions of 'harm' may be absent from popular understandings of financial crimes is more complex than this alone. There is much evidence that British society has a highly ambivalent relationship with non-violent crimes of financial dishonesty, particularly ones perpetrated by respectable people, and this appears to overarch mixed perceptions of victimisation and harm arising from fraud. This dimension appears to have been absent from parliamentary discussions at all stages, and it is in this light that reference to criminological study of white-collar crime can reveal how important British societal understandings of 'respectable crime' are to these critical policy debates.
Criminological study and popular perceptions of crime: a lesson for fraud law reform
The work of Edwin Sutherland shows at one level how financial crimes fit within a broader intellectual appreciation of white-collar crime. Sutherland proposed that many of '[t]he varied types of white collar crimes in business and the professions . . . can be reduced to two categories', the first of which was 'misrepresentation of asset values' which approximated with 'fraud or swindling'. 45 Today, within this literature base, white-collar crime is frequently presented as crime of ambiguity and ambivalence. 46 This is readily apparent in representations of scholars that it is 'less' deserving of the label of 'crime' than other types of criminality, and even that the '[t]he Jekyll-and-Hyde nature of crimes committed by the respectable raises questions unlike those posed by other types of criminal behaviour'. 47 Equally the literature alludes to activity perceived as being more dangerous than other types of crime, and even more criminal because its impact upon society dwarfs that of other criminal behaviour. In this vein, a large body of work identifies the huge pecuniary costs arising from white-collar crime which, unlike many other so called 'ordinary crimes', victimises universally, silently and indiscriminately. 48 However, beyond this, scholars also speak of the way in which inappropriate societal complacency has led to the emergence of a dual system of justice and even 'divided' societies. This 44 These were illustrations of 'everyday-life' crime, also christened 'respectable opportunism' in S. Karstedt 
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reasoning proposes that the operation of dual systems of justice, with one 'for the masses, who commit traditional offenses, and the other for a small select group of white-collar felons', 49 has led to societal divisions which are as marked and as damaging as ones arising on grounds of race. 50 Notwithstanding that the literature points to huge differences in opinion on the status and impact of white-collar crime, it is almost universally represented as crime which does not 'fit' comfortably into societal consciousness.
Thus much scholarly energy has been directed towards exploring these activities, and their perpetrators who according to Sutherland frequently 'do not conform to the popular stereotype of "the criminal"', and who (rightly or wrongly) are not seen as 'criminals in the usual sense of the word'. 51 Furthermore it is also the case that more 'popular' opinion on non-violent financial crimes is equally 'mixed', and many direct and implied references are made by scholars to much more fixed opinions on other more traditional types of crime. Michael Levi's socially superior 'businessman criminal' 52 serves as illustration, and while others speak of the 'myth' of tolerance of white-collar crime, 53 their work also reveals highest levels of intolerance being attached to crimes involving death or serious physical injury. 54 However, the classic study by Stanton Wheeler et al. from 1982 illustrates the repugnance which can be directed towards people who commit crimes arising from greed, especially those who are pillars of respectable communities. 55 This latter sentiment can be found in more popular discourses which represent convicted businessmen as 'thieving millionaires'. 56 However, it is also the case that while for some there will be outrage that there can appear to be 'one law for the rich', 57 for others these activities will be seen as 'victimless' and lacking real harm, notwithstanding the elevated (and even superior) position of their perpetrators, serving as a reminder of how differently financial crimes are capable of being perceived.
This proposition of ambivalent societal perception is at the heart of problems which might arise in securing convictions for fraud under the new fraud offence. For example, it has already been suggested that 'jury 
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psychology' (a term for the difficulties which can arise for juries in their decision-making) might create concerns about determining that a 'respectable opportunist' or businessman who is 'socially superior' has acted dishonestly. 58 It has also been noted that the new law might also tap into judges' anxieties about white-collar criminals. A number of studies, including that of Wheeler et al., found that judges experienced considerable difficulty in punishing those who have led otherwise exemplary lives as trusted and respected members of communities, but whose fraudulent behaviour has often violated the very trust and esteem underpinning this. 59 Although regard is given to an offender's previous record (or absence of it) across sentencing practice and across the spectrum of criminal activity, in order to ensure 'proportionality and . . . that the appropriate sentence is delivered for the offence that was committed', 60 Levi's UK work suggests that 'sentencing white-collar crimes committed by people with no prior convictions' might place particular pressure on judges. This is on account that such cases raise 'in an acute form conflicts between principles of social equity and general deterrability, on the one hand, and individual deterrence or rehabilitation on the other'.
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In this vein, Levi also alluded to judges being sensitive to 'prospective media and social criticism' because of fears that any perceived 'excessive leniency' will undermine public beliefs about the fairness of law.
62 This could also point to discomfort being closely connected with judicial consciousness of ambiguities in more popular perceptions of white-collar crimes and their perpetrators. On this reasoning, judicial sensitivity is also likely to be shaped by the way in which notwithstanding the destructive capabilities of financial crimes, popular perceptions do not always align fraud with 'serious crime', and this is likely to be heightened further for those who become 'fact-finders' in fraud trials. In these circumstances, judges will be even more acutely aware of perceptions (and especially ambivalent and unsettled ones) that fraudsters have too much in common with 'respectable people', and their activities run too closely to too many respectable lives for there to be unqualified endorsement that they must be 'investigated as criminals, tried as criminals and punished as criminals', as former Serious Fraud Office director Rosalind Wright insists fraudsters must be. 
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Academic discourses and real issues: can the fraud offence 'get the law right'?
Although there are a number of possible readings of the 'problem' of fraud, it is a serious problem, and throughout 2006 ministers, Members and peers were keen to stress that it is a mistake to view it as a 'victimless' crime. Thus, the new package of responses-of which the fraud offence forms part-is very important, as the latter parliamentary debates clearly did appreciate. However, it is also vital that the new responses are accompanied by emphasis on changing perceptual appreciations of it. Although there is some recognition of this in articulations of the fallacy of 'victimless crime', this has not been linked explicitly with underlying lack of consensus on the 'problem' of fraud. In this climate, the fraud offence is in danger of becoming a dead letter unless British society becomes more prepared to acknowledge both that business people are capable of being criminals, and accept that the activities of respectable middle class 'opportunists'-such as insurance fraud-can be economically and socially injurious, and are not acceptable. Unless there is societal acceptance that fraud needs to be treated as behaviour to which criminal processes and consequences attach, then fraud under the fraud offence is in danger of becoming what Michael Ashe QC coined, in the context of insider dealing, 'convictionless' crime.
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In considering how to proceed with clarifying perceptions of financial crime to allow the fraud offence to work, it is very important to be aware of academic considerations of whether white-collar crimes are different from other types of crime qualitatively, and are appropriately regarded as being 'less criminal' than activities more readily regarded as criminal activities. This also requires appreciation of alternative reasoning that it is not qualitative distinctiveness which is responsible for more equivocal feelings towards financial crime, but social constructions which have created a 'smokescreen' based on prejudice and misunderstanding. 65 This latter proposition suggests that societal opinion on white-collar crime is less settled not simply because the secretive nature of fraud makes it less visible than other crimes, 66 but because for activities detected, criminal enforcement is frequently the 'road not taken', 67 which in turn for many is a reflection of socio-political indifference. 
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Awareness of these perspectives is essential for appreciating that perceptions of financial crimes are very mixed, and in some respects actually conflicted.
However, as part of this, there must also be understanding of the way in which British society has a long-standing ambivalent relationship with non-violent financial crimes, and especially those committed by 'respectable people'. This relationship with criminal activities commonly found collected under the common parlance of 'fraud' is one which appears to have lacked clarity and comfort since the Victorian discovery of financial crime. This proposition can itself be couched within British societal attitudes towards crime which emerged at the beginning of the 19th century. Historians of crime have long proffered the view that for society at this time crime was the province of the dangerous 'criminal classes' (in contemporary parlance a euphemism for the lower classes) who were 'antithetic of every respectable community'. 69 Significantly, these societal perceptions of crime and deviance were very strongly influenced by the pertaining political climate of the early 19th century. This climate advocated movement away from traditional approaches to crime which rested on community-based policing which was characteristically non-intensive 70 (manifesting a high community tolerance of low level and typically 'petty' crimes 71 ), but set against the backdrop of the extensive Bloody Code of criminal laws, which provided capital punishment for large numbers of crimes.
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In light of industrialisation, and pressures arising from growing doubts on the deterrent effect of the Bloody Code, and also the Enlightenment-influenced humanitarian movement for reform, fundamental alterations to the relationship between crime policing and punishment started to occur during the early years of the 19th century. The 'revolutions' in policing 73 
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his commitment to dismantling the Bloody Code and putting in place the foundations of modern criminal law and accompanying frameworks of criminal culpability. 75 Increasing the translation of crimes committed into crimes punished was key to this new approach, at the heart of which was efficiency in policing, but this was also highly controversial in a society which held dear the liberties of the 'free-born Englishman'. What flowed from this was political appreciation of the need to convey that crime was a growing and increasingly ubiquitous problem. 76 Beyond Peel's reforms, reforming bureaucrat Edwin Chadwick continued to emphasise, most famously as an advocate of modernising policing during the 1830s, that crime was a problem for every respectable community. 77 However, it is also the case that during the 1840s Victorian society became acquainted with what contemporary financial commentator D. M. Evans christened 'high-art crime'. Evans remarked that following the 1840s market crash resulting from over-speculation in railway companies '[the offences of] fraud and forgery and misappropriation' were 'called into existence', along with their 'frightful and heavy legal responsibilities'. 78 However, although Evans was clearly appalled by the unifying motivation to 'make money easily and in a hurry', harboured by all from 'the gigantic forger or swindler' who wished to outshine those around him to the 'reckless speculator' prepared to 'risk everything in the hope of sudden gain, rather than toil safely for a distant reward' and even the apprentice boy who robbed a few shillings from the till 'so that he may enjoy himself on a particular evening' 79 other parts of his commentary on 'the inauguration, development, and rapid progress' of high-art crime 80 reveal quite different reactions. This is because Evans also alluded to this being a 'distinct' type of crime motivated by factors other than poverty and adversity associated with the 'criminal classes'.
Evans insisted that the perpetrators of high-art crime were not like the 'many thousands, unfortunately in every large community who are born, bred and nurtured into crime, and who resort to it naturally and from necessity'.
81 High-art criminals were instead induced by temptation to tamper with the weighty trusts reposed in them, and many did so in order to fund extravagant lifestyles. Evans also recognised that temptation could arise from the desperation of a businessman on the brink of financial ruin, but he believed these occurrences were frequently the 
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result of indulgence in 'ill-considered enterprises', 82 and on one occasion declared that 'no crime can be more heinous against society . . . than a breach of mercantile trust'. 83 Thus, notwithstanding his own 'ambiguities', Evans did in many respects believe that while capable of being 'heinous', high-art crime was also something quite distinct from what writers of a modern persuasion might call 'ordinary' crime or 'traditional' crime.
Current difficulties and long-standing attitudinal patterns
According to historian Martin Wiener, financial crimes were amongst a number of new crimes discovered in the 19th century which implicated the respectable in ways which traditional crimes rarely had. 84 However, unlike Wiener's other examples of poisoning and blackmail, financial crimes would present particular challenges, because according to Edwin Chadwick they were 'divested of animosity on the part of the offender, of physical injury and physical alarm to the party defrauded'. 85 In 1839 Chadwick suggested that the recently observed increase in fraudulent crimes had accompanied a recorded decline in violent crimes, and this signalled a less barbarous society. Violent crimes were of course at the extreme end of Chadwick's 'one great criminal profession', to which 'habitual depredators' such as '[t]hieves, prostitutes, &c, seem to belong', 86 through which he communicated his warnings about the dangers of crime. Thus, alongside and against such activities it is not difficult to see that fraudulent crimes might have appeared less concerning.
However, Chadwick also intimated that fraudulent crimes may not actually require the same responses as the '[t]hieves, prostitutes & c' who-violent or otherwise-were the scourge of respectable communities, because such activities 'yield more readily to available remedies, in the shape of obstacles which may be interposed to render the offence more difficult, dangerous and unprofitable'. 87 Thus distinctions between 'traditional' crime and 'other' types of deviance were being discussed by criminal policy-makers even prior to the market crash of the 1840s. This is highly significant because the events of the 1840s appear to have been critical in creating perceptual awareness that financial crimes were capable of amounting to 'infamous' crime, which if allowed to go unpunished 'would be a disgrace to the law of any country'.
88 Nevertheless, in these earlier years there was suggestion that fraudulent activities did not necessarily require the same responses as the activities of 'habitual depredators'.
In the criminal trials which followed the aftermath of the railway boom there is much which is interesting about the ways in which prosecutors actively pushed the proposition of criminal liability for 'business crime'. It is, for example, apparent from the earliest fraud trials how the proceedings reflected key concerns of business failure and the limits of legitimate risk-taking and acceptable business conduct, as Victorian society struggled with the implications of a developing, and highly dynamic and also little-regulated capitalist economy. It is also interesting to see how alongside this, the proceedings also became extensive discussions of expectations pertaining to occupational conduct arising from personal morality, pursued through reference to defendants' respectability and esteem. 89 Both these themes are of course dominant in discourses today: forming the basis of contentions that white-collar crime is different from other types of crime and this has to be reflected in approaches to it, but also others which suggest that it is inappropriately treated as 'lesser crime' or 'not real crime'. But for the purposes of this discussion on ambiguous perceptions of white-collar crime, the trials also reveal judges trying to reason and explain the occurrence of activity which while it was unacceptable in many respects did not really 'fit' comfortably into prevailing societal stereotypings of crime and deviance.
Dating from times when Enlightenment associationalist ideologies were dominant within penal thought and policy, proffering that crime was not a product of birth, but instead a product of social dysfunction (people were not born evil, they were instead made evil by society 90 ) judges in the earliest fraud trials explored the ways in which business crimes committed by respectable people-while capable of being 'infamous' and warranting punishment-could be very different from ones which were rooted in poverty and hostile social conditions. The trial of London bankers Strahan, Bates and Paul in 1855 for their embezzlement of moneys entrusted to them as bankers reveals how, in these proceedings, financial dishonesty was often contrasted with the activities of those described as 'common felons', and from 'lower conditions of life'. 91 Although the prisoners were sentenced to transportation for a period of 14 years following their conviction for a crime described by presiding Baron Alderson as the most serious which could be imagined in a 'great commercial community like this', the judge described his duty to pass sentence as a painful one because prior to appearing before him 'in the prisoners' dock' they had once 'moved in a position of society'. This comment proposed that crimes committed out of greed were more reprehensible than crimes committed out of need, but a distinction between them was nevertheless drawn. It is highly likely that this Enlightenment-influenced commentary contributed to strengthening opinion that crimes of deceit and dishonesty in pursuit of greed and selfpromotion were socially injurious, and possibly especially reprehensible. 93 Equally it was becoming apparent in the same discourses that such activities committed by those who had been reduced to the position of 'common felons' would not obviously be regarded in the same way as crimes committed by those who were common felons and these situations were somehow different. Then as now, there was 'strong sentiment against crimes of greed rather than need, against crimes committed by persons in positions of trust and authority', 94 while definite references were also made to crime which was not necessarily the 'same as' that arising from 'lower conditions of life' and which may not necessarily require the same responses.
Over 50 years after these earliest fraud trials from the 1850s, work commissioned from forensic statistician Dr Charles Goring in 1913 95 was instrumental in establishing a more aggressive approach to prosecutions of fraud, and ultimately paved the way for establishment of the Fraud Squad in 1946. 96 Goring's legacy also illuminates the complexities which continued to pervade social and legal acceptance of white-collar crime during the early 20th century. In Goring's opinion criminals he identified as 'Fraudulent criminals' had far more in common with the law abiding sections of society than with those who committed other types of crimes, in terms of their 'marriage rates, occupation and other social conditions-including low degrees of alcoholism and higher than average intelligence and education'. They were far removed from 'Habitual criminals' who were incorrigible law-breakers, and who were the furthest removed from ordinary law-abiding citizens. 97 The apparent paradox within Goring's legacy of intensification of response to 'respectable crime' and his thoughts on the criminal activities of those who had more in common with law-abiding citizens than the 'criminal population' can also be read in a way which warns of the challenges lying ahead of the fraud offence, almost a century later.
The contemporary package of responses designed to increase effectiveness in detection and effective prosecution along with 'getting the law right' thus needs to acknowledge that many potential fraudsters will have much in common with those who are, if not respectable, at least normatively lawful. In the earliest years of the 20th century Goring had some difficulties in reconciling financial criminals as criminals, and today these problems remain for fact-finders within the criminal process who are closest 'to the problem, facing it every week'. 98 For such factfinders, notwithstanding the destructive capabilities of financial crimes, their acceptance as criminal activities remains problematic. In the case of everyday-life crime Karstedt and Farrall found that 'respectable (and outwardly normatively lawful) people' have difficulties in regarding respectable opportunism, such as insurance fraud, as anything more serious than that. Equally, for many, any perceived social superiority of businessmen is also accompanied by too great a distance from the 'crime scene' located within the commercial sphere.
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Making the law work: a way forward and some concluding thoughts
While the Solicitor-General remarked in June 2006 that '[t]he Bill will not be a panacea for preventing fraud' and even that '[w]e should not overrate the capacity of the criminal law alone to solve this or any other problem', 100 this comment appears to have been framed in order to emphasise the new substantive law as part of a strategic 'package' of responses, targeting fraud on a number of fronts. However, it could equally be a prelude to the proposition that the fraud offence will only 'get the law right' if juries and judges are prepared to find that a defendant has acted dishonestly in making a representation, in failing to disclose information while under a legal duty, or has abused a position of trust. This requires societal acceptance that this underlying behaviour is unacceptable, which is in turn premised on achieving much greater perceptual acceptance of fraud as crime than is currently the case. It is here that academic analysis (cast around different perspectives on whether fraud is real crime and should not be treated any differently from other types of crime) which identifies and explains that perceptions are unsettled is a starting-point for clarifying in societal consciousness that fraud is serious and it is unacceptable. However, just as scholars remain divided around the ambiguous nature of white-collar crimes, achieving popular consensus about fraud will remain difficult if pursued on this reasoning alone, which involves making comparisons between different types of crime where 'the notion of disparity assumes we are comparing like with like, and it is precisely this that is so difficult'.
Thus, while it is important to communicate that there are ambivalencesHowever, messages against tolerance of fraud will have only limited impact unless they are communicated more widely than in Hansard reportings alone. What is required instead is extensive and effective communication and education about the harms arising from fraud, and a detailed consideration of how this might be conducted is being made elsewhere. 107 For present purposes, and in anticipation of fuller discussion, one obvious starting point is for those who have recently concluded debating the new law in Parliament to play a key role in communicating the 'problem of fraud' into wider societal spheres. In this vein, the observations made above by Jeremy Wright MP in relation to jurors could be directed to suggest to those in Parliament that public opinion will respond very positively to 'matters put before it' as long as this is done in a 'straightforward way' by key policy-makers. An exploration is currently being made of how media attention given to crime and punishment 108 might be a key element in communication that activities which result in higher prices for 'security systems, banking services, credit and goods, and . . . insurance', and cost UK business by 'undermining confidence in the institutions which are needed to trade and create wealth' 109 are serious crimes, and ones which as a society we have a responsibility to treat as such. Until this happens, serious concerns remain over whether the new fraud offence will 'get the law right' because this message is simply not being communicated either directly enough or sufficiently extensively in popular discourse.
